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Comment

Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection
District: Exploring the Parameters of the
Normal Risks of Employment Test

The workers' compensation system is designed to compensate an

employee' for work-related industrial injuries. 2 Workers' compensation is a no-fault liability system. 3 In return for the employer assuming

liability without fault, an employee must accept workers' compen1. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (West Supp. 1987) (defining employee as "every person in
the service of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship,
express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed").
2. Id. at § 3600. See generally 1 A. LARSON, TiE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 5.20 (2d ed. 1985) (compensation legislation arose out of the coincidence of increasing
industrial injuries and decreasing common-law remedies for the employee's injuries); 2 W.
HANNA, CALIFORrA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INiREIs AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.01[2]
(2d ed. 1986).
3. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1987). See also 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, §
5.10, at 35 (the American workers' compensation scheme imposed unilateral liability without
fault upon the employer and made the employer bear the entire burden of insuring against
such liability). The development of the no-fault workers' compensation system was influenced
by the social principles of nineteenth-century Germany. Among the noted German philosophers,
Fichte was responsible for espousing the idea that the misfortunes, disabilities and accidents
of individuals are social and not individual in origin, and the state should be concerned with
helping them. Id. at 33-34. See also Portillo v. G.T. Price Prod., Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 285,
287-88, 182 Cal. Rptr. 291, 293 (1982) (the Workers' Compensation Act is designed to afford
workers quick determination of their claims for injury without regard to common-law questions
of liability, negligence, or fault).
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sation as the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries.4 Difficult
issues arise, however, when an employee claims that the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is not governed by the
exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.' In particular, the California Supreme Court case of Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire
Protection District6 has raised questions concerning the proper apan employee
plication of the exclusivity provision to cases where
7
alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In Cole, the California Supreme Court decided that the exclusive
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act precludes a
civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress when an
injury occurs that is within the normal risks of employment.' In
determining whether the injury was within the normal risks of employment, the Cole court focused on the conduct of the employer,
rather than on the injury suffered by the employee. 9 If the conduct
of the employer is construed as a normal risk of employment, 0
workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy, and a tort action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot be brought."

4. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3601a, 3602a (West Supp. 1987). See also 2A A. LARSON, supra
note 2, at § 65.11 (part of the bargain and exchange in which the sacrifices and gains of an
employee and an employer are put in balance so that, although the employer assumes liability
without fault, he is relieved of the prospect of a large civil verdict).

5. CAL. LAB. CODE

§ 3200 (West Supp. 1987) ("workmen's compensation" shall be

referred to as workers' compenstion); id. §§ 3200-9061 (the Workers' Compenstion Act); id.
§ 3602a (exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act). See infra text
accompanying notes 41-46 (complete discussion of the exclusive remedy provision of the
Workers' Compensation Act).
6. 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 129-44.
8. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
9. Id. Prior to Cole, the California courts focused on the injury of the employee in
determining whether workers' compensation provided the exclusive remedy for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 155-57, 729 P.2d at 747-48, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13.
If only emotional harm was alleged, an employee was entitled to bring a civil action. Id. See
Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 840, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 450-51 (1978).
If, however, an employee alleged physical injuries accompanying the emotional distress,
workers' compensation was deemed the exclusive remedy. Id. See Hollywood Refrigeration
Sales Co. v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 754, 759, 210 Cal. Rptr. 619, 621 (1985); Gates
v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 206, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486, 492 (1979); Ankeny v.
Lockheed Missles & Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 535, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828, 831 (1979).
The different treatment of intentional infliction of emotional distress by Renteria on the one
hand, and Gates-Ankeny on the other, will be designated throughout this comment as the
"physical versus non-physical injury" distinction.
10. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987) (the court listed demotions, promotions, criticism of work practices,
and frictions in negotiations as to grievances as examples of risks normally occurring in the
workplace).
11. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 121-23 (the normal risk test may only apply
to cases in which physical injury is present).
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Subsequent to the decision in Cole, Hart v. National Mortgage
and Land Co. 12 addressed the issue of what the available remedy
should be when the conduct of the employer is outside the normal
risks of employment. Like Cole, the Hart court focused on the
conduct of the employer in determining whether workers' compensation provided the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries.13 Since
the conduct of the employer was found to be outside the normal
risks of employment, the Hart court held that the employee was
entitled to bring a civil action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.14 Unlike Hart, the Cole court did not discuss what remedy
should be available to the employee when the conduct of the employer
is not a normal risk of employment. 15
The purpose of this comment is to address the question of whether
workers' compensation should be the exclusive remedy for intentional
infliction of emotional distress when the conduct of the employer is
within the normal risks of employment. This comment will explore
the history of both the workers' compensation system and the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 16 The interaction between the workers' compensation system and the general principles
of tort law will also be examined.' 7 Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection
District will then be analyzed to determine the scope of the normal
risks of employment test. 8 Furthermore, various aspects of the Cole
opinion will be criticized.' 9 Next, the 1982 amendments to the California Workers' Compensation Act will be discussed to determine
legislative intent with respect to the application of the exclusivity
provision to intentional infliction of emotional distress. 20 Finally,
Hart v. National Mortgage and Land Co. will be evaluated to
determine whether Hart is consistent with the reasoning in Cole, and
whether a civil action is permissable when the conduct of the employer
is outside the normal risks of employment. 2' This comment will

12. 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 235 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1987).
13. Id. at 1429, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (1987) (the court held that the "physical versus nonphysical injury" distinction employed by courts prior to Cole, should be discarded).
14. Id. at 1430, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
15. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308,
315, 729 P.2d 743, 750 (1987) (the court held only that when an employer's conduct is a
normal risk of employment, then workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 24-72.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 73-91.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 92-128, 144-52.
19.
20.
21.

See infra text accompanying notes 129-43.
See infra text accompanying notes 153-68.
See infra text accompanying notes 172-95.
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propose that when a cause of action for intentional infliction of

emotional distress is properly alleged, an employee should be allowed
to pursue a civil action whenever conduct of the employer is deemed

outrageous. 22 Finally, this comment will also propose that in certain
whether or not physical
circumstances civil actions should be allowed
23
harm accompanies the emotional distress.
WORKERS'

A.

COMPENSATION

HistoricalBackground

The onset of the Industrial Revolution brought problems for both
employees and society at large. 24 Employees encountered both a sharp

increase in industrial accidents, and a decrease in common law
remedies for their injuries.25 The increasing incidence of industrial
accidents coupled with the difficulty in proving employer liability,
left many employees with insufficient remedies. 2 6 Workers' compensation legislation was a reaction to the proliferation of injuries in
the industrial workplace. 27
The workers' compensation system is predicated on a policy of
employer no-fault liability.28 The general theory behind the system is
that employers are in the best position to disperse the cost of accident
losses. 29 This type of "cost-spreading" benefits society by helping to
22. See infra text accompanying notes 196-222.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 196-222.
24. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 4.0, 5.20. See generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 2,
§ 1.05[1] (since the amelioration of social conditions is a state function and victims of industrial
accidents were without adequate legal remedies, the state may conceive that its proper function
is to take steps necessary to correct the situation).
25. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 4.30-4.50. This decrease was due in part to the
common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow
servant doctrine. Id. at § 4.30. In addition since many of the injuries suffered by employees
were caused by accidents other than by the negligence of the employer and acts of God, the
injuries were deemed non-compensable. Id. Moreover, co-employees who were often the only
witnesses to an industrial accident, were frequently reluctant to testify against their employers
for fear of losing their jobs. Id.
26. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 4.50 (studies made prior to the enactment of the
worker's compensation legislation indicated that the employer liability laws were a complete
failure because many of the injuries were left uncompensated).
27. Id. at § 5.20.
28. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 65.0.
29. See, e.g., G. Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents 39-44 (1970) (loss spreading reduces
secondary accident costs). See Comment, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements
of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARy. L. REv. 1641, 1647 (1983) (employers can
disperse the burden of accident losses within the industry, among consumers and among
employees in general); I A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 1.0 (the cost of work-related injuries are
ultimately placed on the consumer); 2 W. HANNA, supra note 2, § 1.05[21 (discussion of cost
spreading).
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prevent a disproportionate effect on a few individuals, and reducing
total accident-related costs.3 0 Since the employer assumes liability
without fault, the exclusive remedy available to the injured employee
is workers' compensation. 3' The exclusive remedy provision is based
upon reciprocal concessions.3 2 In exchange for a speedy and guaranteed recovery, the employee relinquishes the right to attempt to
recover a greater award for damages in the tort system. 33 The
employer, on the other hand, is deemed liable without regard to
34
fault, but is protected from a potentially larger civil verdict.
The workers' compensation system serves various purposes. In
theory, the system protects employees against economic insecurity .by
providing prompt, reasonable compensation while the employee is
unable to work. 35 In addition, the system effectuates the rehabilitation
and reentry of the employee into the labor market.3 6 These goals,
however, are not always realized. Generally, compensation under the

system is limited to medical and rehabilitation costs, 37 and roughly
two-thirds of the income loss resulting from each accident. 38 Injuries
that do not affect employability, such as disfigurement or pain and
suffering, are left uncompensated. 39 As a result of the inadequacies

30. G. CALBaRSI, supra note 29, at 27.
31. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 65.11. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (vest Supp. 1987).
32. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 65.11.
33. Id.
34. Id. See also CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a) (West Supp. 1987) (liability for compensation
shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an employer).
35. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 2, § 1.05[3]. See also Moyer v. W.C.A.B., 10 Cal. 3d 222,
233, 514 P.2d 1224, 1231, 110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 151 (1973) (the primary purpose of industrial
compensation is to ensure injured employees an adequate means of subsistence while they are
unable to work); Santiago v. Employee Benefit Serv., 168 Cal. App. 3d 898, 901, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 679, 681 (1985) (the underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to provide
a quick, simple, and readily accessible method of claiming and receiving compensation);
Portillo v. G.T. Price Prod., Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 285, 287-88, 182 Cal. Rptr. 291, 293
(1982) (the Workers' Compenstion Act is designed to afford workers quick determination of
their claims for injury).
36. Id. The California Constitution states that the purpose of a workers' compensation
system is to "accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and
without incumbrance of any character." CAL. CONsT. art. XX, § 21.
37. See generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 2, § 1.0515]; 2 B. WrrTI, SUMARItY OF
CALIFoRNIA LAW § 250, at 820 (9th ed. 1987) (discussing injuries compensable under workers'
compensation).
38. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 4453 (West Supp. 1987); 1 S. HERICIC, CAL FoRNA
WORKERS' COUPENSATION LAW §§ 5.17-5.23 (3d ed. 1987).
39. See 2 B. Wrncm,, supra note 37, § 250 (for a work-related injury the employer is liable
for medical costs, rehabilitation benefits, death and burial expenses, and idemnity for disability).
See also Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1975). In Williams, an employee suffered an injury resulting in loss of sexual performance.
Id. at 121-22, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 815. The court held that a work-related injury could not be
divided into separate elements of damage even though some injuries were unrelated to earning
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of the workers' compensation system, both the California legislature
and judiciary have created exceptions to the exclusivity provision
40
which allow employees to bring a civil action.
B.

Workers' Compensation Act

Certain statutory conditions must be met before the workers'
compensation system will be triggered. 41 Workers' compensation is
available only when an employee suffers an injury arising out of and
within the course of employment.4 2 There are limitations, however,
on the right of an employee to seek redress in the workers' compen43
sation system, even when the injury is work-related.
Although workers' compensation generally provides the exclusive
remedy for work-related injuries, statutory exceptions to the exclusivity provision allow an injured employee to bring an alternative
action." The question remains, however, whether there are additional

capacity and noncompensable in a workers' compensation proceeding. Id. at 122, 123 Cal.
Rptr. at 815. Consequently, in Williams, since the loss of sexual performance did not cause
an employment disability, the injury was noncompensable in workers' compensation. Id.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 216-17 (the 1982 amendments to the Workers'
Compensation Act codified several judicially-created exceptions to the exclusivity provision
allowing an action at law).
41. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a) (West Supp. 1987).
42. Id. Broadly interpreted, an injury is said to arise out of and in the course of
employment when the injury takes place within the period of the employment, at a place
where the employee reasonably should be, and while the employee is fulfilling duties or engaged
in doing something incidental thereto. See, e.g., J.T. Thorp, Inc. v. W.C.A.B., 153 Cal. App.
3d 327, 200 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1984) (compensation may be awarded under the Workers'
Compensation Act for any injury or disease arising out of or in the course of employment);
Maher v. W.C.A.B., 33 Cal. 3d 729, 661 P.2d 1058, 190 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1983) (an injury
arises out of and in the course of employment when the employee performs a duty imposed
by the employer); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 77 Cal. App. 2d 461, 175
P.2d 884 (1947) (an injury arises out of employment when there is a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is to be performed and the resulting injury).
43. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a)(4)-(9) (Vest Supp. 1987). Workers' compensation is not
triggered where the injury is caused by the intoxication of the injured employee, where the
employee's injury is intentionally self-inflicted, where the employee willfully and deliberately
caused his own death, where the injury arises out of an altercation in which the injured
employee was the initial physical aggressor, and where the injury of the employee is caused
by the employee's own felonious act. Id.
44. Id. § 3602. California Labor Code Section 3602 states that workers' compensation is
the exclusive remedy except in the following instances:
1. Where the employee's injury is proximately caused by a willful physical assault
by the employer.
2. Where the employee's injury is aggravated by the employer's fraudulent
concealment of the existence of the injury and its connection with the employment,
in which case the employer's liability shall be limited to those damages proximately
caused by the aggravation. The burden of proof respecting apportionment of damages
between the injury and any subsequent aggravation thereof is upon the employer.
3. Where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused by a defective
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exceptions to the exclusivity provision which have not been codified. 45
Much debate has centered around whether a civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be allowed or whether
the tort is barred by the exclusivity provision of workers' compen6
sation.4
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

A.

Development of the Tort

Prior to the 1930's, American courts didnot recognize a separate
47
and distinct tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress .

Recovery of damages for emotional distress was allowed only when
another tort was committed.4 8 During the 1930's, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was first recognized. 49 At that

time courts required however, that physical injuries accompany the
emotional distress to sustain an action. 0
In State Rubbish Collectors Associations v. Siliznoff,51 the Cali-

fornia Supreme Court held that consequential physical injuries are
not necessary to sustain a tort action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.5 2 The court reasoned that when mental suffering
constitutes a major-element of damages, an anomaly exists when a
tort recovery is denied because the intentional conduct of the defend-

product manufactured by the employer and sold, leased, or otherwise transferred
for valuable consideration to an independent third person, and that product is
thereafter provided for the employee's use by a third person.
Id.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 153-74.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 73-222.
47. W. P.OSSER, W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 60 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. PROSSER & W. KEETON].
48. See, e.g., American Sec. Co. v. Cook, 49 Ga. App. 723, 176 S.E. 798 (1934) (emotional
distress damages recoverable in a trespass to land action); Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga.
App. 778, 171 S.E. 470 (1933) (emotional distress damages allowed in an assault case);
Salisbury v. Paulson, 51 Utah 552, 172 P. 315 (1918) (emotional distress damages allowed in
a false imprisonment action); DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881) (emotional
distress damages recoverable in a battery suit).
49.
V. PROSSER & V. KEETON, supra note 47, at 60-61. A minority of courts still refuse
to recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate tort. See, e.g., Jeffersonville Silgas, Inc. v. Wilson, 154 Ind. App. 398, 290 N.E.2d 113 (1972); Harned v. E-Z Finance
Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953). Cases are collected in Annot. 38 A.L.R. 4th 998,
1030-32, 1034-35 (1985).
50. Prior cases had required physical injury or some other nonmental damage to protect
against fraudulent claims. See, e.g., Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d
81 (1953); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936).
51. 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
52. Id. at 338, 240 P.2d at 286.
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ant falls short of producing physical injury. 3 The Siliznoff court
concluded that when the conduct of the defendant is outrageous,
there is a sufficient guarantee that the emotional distress suffered by

4
the plaintiff is genuine.1
In order to sustain an action for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, the plaintiff must show that the defendant harbored the

requisite mental state.55 The defendant must intend to cause mental
suffering in the plaintiff, possess the knowledge that mental suffering
is substantially certain to result, or act with reckless disregard of the
high probability that the plaintiff will suffer emotional distress .16 In
addition, California cases clearly establish that in order for an
intentional infliction of emotional distress action to lie, the defendant
must have been aware or substantially certain that the plaintiff will
perceive the outrageous conduct.5 7 If the defendant knows of the
presence of the plaintiff, it is more certain that the defendant
reasonably anticipated to cause emotional distress to the plaintiff.58
The refusal of the California courts to apply the doctrine of transferred intent59 to intentional infliction of emotional distress cases
constitutes a major limitation on the tort.6°
A reasonable person standard is applied to determine whether the
conduct of the defendant was outrageous. 6' If the conduct of the
defendant is not objectively outrageous, the plaintiff cannot recover
even if the plaintiff is especially sensitive to such conduct. 62 However,

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. W. PROSSER & W. KE ToN, supra note 47, § 12, at 64-65.
56. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 46 (1965); Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932,
946, 603 P.2d 58, 67, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 149-50 (1979); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal.
3d 493, 498, 468 P.2d 216, 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970); Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments,
60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 296-97, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547, 552-53 (1976).
57. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 12, at 64-65. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Vallelunga, 171 Cal. App. 2d 107, 109, 339 P.2d 910, 911 (1959) (action at law for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was denied because plaintiff failed to allege that defendants
knew that plaintiff was present and witnessed the beating of her father).
58. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 12, at 64-65; Taylor, 171 Cal. App. 2d
at 109, 339 P.2d at 911.
59. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 12, at 65. As an example, if a person
intentionally directs an act towards Abel, but wrongfully hits Baker, the intent is said to have
transferred from Abel to Baker and the person is liable to Baker even though he did not
intend to hit Baker. Id.
60. The refusal to apply the doctrine to the tort has a limiting effect because plaintiffs
cannot recover unless the conduct of the defendant is directed at them. Id. at 64-65.
61. Scott v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 Cal. App. 3d 277, 291, 112 Cal. Rptr. 609,
619 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF.TORTS § 46 comment j (1965); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 47, § 12, at 63-64.
62. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 12, at 63-64.
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when the defendant indulges in acts designed to prey upon a special
6
sensitivity of the plaintiff, liability may attach. 1
B.

Application of the Tort in the Workplace

The leading case dealing with intentional infliction of emotional
distress in the workplace was Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. 4 In
Alcorn, the plaintiff was a black truck driver and a member of the
Teamster's Union.65 When the field superintendent learned that the
plaintiff had advised another employee not to drive a truck because
the employee was not a union member, the field superintendent
allegedly shouted at the plaintiff in a rude and violent manner.6 6 The
field superintendent then allegedly shouted racial ephitets at the
plaintiff and fired him.67 The plaintiff suffered humiliation, and
emotional and physical distress.6 The plaintiff argued that he should
be allowed to pursue a civil action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against his employer.69 Although the exclusivity
provision of workers' compensation was not an issue in Alcorn, the
court reasoned that the invasion of mental and emotional tranquility
alone is a sufficient basis for a tort action.70 Moreover, the court
indicated that abuse of the employment relationship can constitute
outrageous conduct because of the inherent power of the employer
7
over the interest of the employee. 1
After Alcorn was decided, employers began raising the exclusivity
provision of workers' compensation as a defense in civil actions for
intentional infliction of emotional distress cases.7 2 Thereafter, the
issue of whether the workers' compensation system provides the
exclusive remedy for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional

63. See Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498, 468 P.2d 216, 218-19, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 88, 90-91 (1970) (use of racial epithet in face of plaintiff's peculiar susceptibility held
sufficient to support an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress when defendant
knew or should have known of plaintiff's susceptibility); Wallis v. Superior Court, 106 Cal.
App. 3d 1113, 1120, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 130 (1984) (employer who knew of plaintiff's special
susceptibility to financial injury held liable for inflicting such injury).
64. 2 Cal. 3d 493, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
65. Id. at 496, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 497, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
70. Id. at 498-99, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91.
71.

Id.

72. See infra text accompanying notes 73-128, 178-93 (discussing application of the
exclusive remedy provision to intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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distress in the workplace has been the subject of much controversy
among courts and commentators.
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION

A. Prior to Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District
Prior to 1978, the issue of whether workers' compensation provided
the exclusive remedy for intentional infliction of emotional distress
remained undecided. In Renteria v. County of Orange,73 the court
held that the employee should be allowed to pursue a civil remedy
because the employee did not suffer any physical disability compensable in the workers' compensation system as a result of intentionally inflicted emotional distress. 74 The Renteria court reasoned
that limiting the employee to only workers' compensation could
7
effectively shield the employer from all liability.
The Renteria court noted that the mere existence of an injury not
recoverable under workers' compensation did not necessarily entitle
76
a court to imply an exception to the exclusive remedy provision.
According to the Renteria court, the Legislature did not intend that
the employee surrender all'rights to compensation for mental suffering
caused by extreme and outrageous conduct. 77 In addition, the Renteria
court noted that the tort involves intentional wrongdoing for which
the "no-fault" workers' compensation system fails to provide a
sufficient deterrent. 78 Therefore, intentional infliction of emotional
distress was outside the contemplation of the workers' compensation
system.7 9 Accordingly, the Renteria court created an implied exception
to the exclusivity provision of workers' compensation in order to
ensure some compensation for the injured employees.8 0 Thus, the
employee Was able to bring a civil action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147
Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr.
Id.
Id. at 840, 147 Cal. Rptr.
Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr.
Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr.

Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
at 451-52.
at 451.
at 452.
at 451-52.

79. Id. (intentional infliction of emotional distress comprises an entire class of civil wrongs
outside the contemplation of the workers' compensation system).
80. Id.
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After Renteria, some courts refused to extend the implied exception
to the exclusivity requirement to actions where physical injuries
accompanied the emotional distress. In Gates v. Trans Video Corp."'
the plaintiff allegedly suffered a back injury on the job. 2 When the
plaintiff went to discuss sick pay benefits with the manager, an
argument ensued. 83 The plaintiff was subsequently fired.8 4 As a result
85
of the termination, the plaintiff allegedly suffered emotional distress.
In Ankeny v. Lockheed Missles and Space Co.,86 the defendant
allegedly harassed the plaintiff by assigning him to tasks not appropriate to his skills, transferring him from one job to another, passing
him over for promotion twice and terminating him. 87 The plaintiff
allegedly suffered both physical and emotional harm as a result of
the harassment. 8 Both the Gates and Ankeny courts reasoned that
the Renteria court allowed a tort action only because the emotional
distress injuries were not compensable within the workers' compensation system. 89 According to the Gates and Ankeny courts, the
exclusivity provision applies whenever the employee has suffered
physical injuries compensable within the workers' compensation system.90 In contrast, the exclusivity provision does not apply when
emotional distress is the only injury suffered.9 1

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 155
Id. at 199, 155 Cal. Rptr.
Id.
Id. at 200, 155 Cal. Rptr.
Id. at 201, 155 Cal. Rptr.
88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151

Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979).
at 488.
at 488.
at 489.
Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979).

87. Id. at 534, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
88. Id.
89. Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 205, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486, 492;
Ankeny, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 535, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
90. Gates, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 205, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 492; Ankeny, 88 Cal. App. 3d at
535, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
91. Gates, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 205, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 492; Ankeny, 88 Cal. App. 3d at
535, 151 Cal. Rptr at 831. Cases decided after Renteria have been inconsistent in applying the
"physical versus non-physical injury" distinction when determining whether a tort action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress could be brought. For example in McGee v. McNally,
119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981), the plaintiff alleged that while he was a
foreman at Stanford University Hospital, he was the victim of a campaign instigated by the
plaintiff's supervisors to harass and oust him from his job. Id. at 893, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
The California Court of Appeal for the First District took a minority stance, allowing the
employee to bring a civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress even though
physical injuries were alleged. Id. at 895, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 255. The McGee court held that
under appropriate circumstances, compensation outside the workers' compensation system
should be allowed. Id. The court reasoned that if the injuries suffered by the employee were
non-physical and the basis of the claim is also non-physical, then the employee should not be
barred from suing at law even if physical injuries are alleged. Id. at 894-95, 174 Cal. Rptr.
at 255-56. Similarly, in Iverson v. Atlas Pacific Engineering, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 191 Cal.
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B.

Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District

In Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District,92 the California
Supreme Court examined the interaction between workers' compen-

sation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The challenge
before the Cole court was to delineate the circumstances under which
workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. The Cole court focused on the
conduct of the employer in determining whether workers' compen-

sation provides the exclusive remedy for intentional infliction of
93
emotional distress.

1.

The Facts

Cole was a firefighter in Fair Oaks and a union representative. 94
Cole alleged that the assistant fire chief engaged in harassing and
punishing Cole for his activities as union representative. 9 The assistant chief's activities culminated in a disciplinary hearing based on
false charges. 9 6 Subsequent to the hearing, Cole was demoted, as-

signed to perform not only humiliating duties, but also to work as
a dispatcher. 97 Although the District Board of Directors reversed

Cole's demotion and reinstated him as captain, the assistant fire
chief persisted in harassing Cole by filing an application with the
State Personnel Employees Retirement System to force Cole to re-

Rptr. 696 (1983), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's agent set up a steel horseshoe target
directly above the plaintiff's place of work, forced plaintiff to remain in confined quarters
against his will, and repeatedly pounded the sledgehammer against the target to cause loud
crashing noises upon plaintiff. Id. at 222, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 697. The California Court of
Appeal for the First District held that an employee could sue in a civil action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress notwithstanding allegations of physical injuries. Id. at 230, 191
Cal. Rptr. at 703. The appellate court allowed a civil action because the gravemen of the
complaint was emotional harm not physical disability. Id. The Iverson court concluded that it
would be contrary to the policy behind the Workers' Compensation Act, which was designed
to benefit employees, if the employer were shielded from liability for intentional and outrageous
conduct. Id. at 230, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 704. On the other hand, some courts have read Renteria
as creating a blanket exception to the exclusivity provision for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See Russell v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983)(applying
California law). Under this view, a plaintiff may proceed in a civil action regardless of whether
there is physical injury. Id. at 493-95.
92. 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987).
93. Id. at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
94. Id. at 152, 729 P.2d at 744, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 152-53, 729 P.2d at 744-45, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
97. Id. at 153, 729 P.2d at 745, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 310. Cole had worked as a dispatcher,
a job unsuited to his senior status, 11 years earlier. Id.
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tire. 9 Cole further alleged that this continuous harassment by the
assistant fire chief elevated his blood pressure.9 9 Cole ultimately
suffered a severe stroke which left him totally disabled.'0° The plain-

tiff filed a civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
against his employer.' 0 ' The trial court sustained the defendant's
demurrer on the ground that the claim was governed exclusively by
the workers' compensation system.10 2 The plaintiff appealed and the
Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment of the trial court
and the court of appeal. 0 3

2.

The Opinion

The Cole court began with an analysis of the "physical versus
non-physical injury" distinction. The Cole court emphasized that the

basis for the Renteria decision in allowing a civil action when no
physical injuries were alleged, was the perceived absence of any other

deterrent to intentionally tortious conduct.

04

If deterrents in the

workers' compensation system were available, the Cole court stated,

a civil action would be superfluous. 0 The Cole majority perceived
California Labor Code Section 4553 as deterring intentionally tortious

conduct by providing for an increase in compensation benefits for
the "serious and willful misconduct" of the employer. 0 6 Another
potential deterrent discussed in the Cole opinion was the prospect of

a workers' compensation award itself. 0 7 The Cole court determined

that the presence of statutorily provided deterrents undermines the
theoretical underpinning of the Renteria decision. 08

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (Cole cannot move, care for himself, or communicate other than by blinking).
101. Id. at 151, 729 P.2d at 744, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 155-56, 729 P.2d at 747-48, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13.
105. Id. at 156-57, 729 P.2d at 748, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
106. Id. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1987) ("The amount of compensation
otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half ... where the employee is injured by reason
of the serious and willful misconduct of ... [the employer or enumerated representatives
thereof)"). See also CAL. INS. CODE § 11661 (West 1972) (an insurer shall not insure against
the liability of the employer for the additional compensation recoverable for serious and willful
misconduct of the employer).
107. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d 157, 729 P.2d at 748, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (paying out workers'
compensation claims costs the employer's money). See also CAL. LAB. CODE § 3700 (West
Supp. 1987) (every employer must carry workers' compensation insurance).
108. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 157, 729 P.2d at 748, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
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The plaintiff in Cole also relied on Johns-Manville v. Superior

Court.0 9 In Johns-Manville, the employer intended to injure the

plaintiff by fraudulently concealing the presence of a hazardous
condition in the workplace and inducing the employee to continue

working." 0 The California Supreme Court held that an employee was
not precluded from bringing a civil action for intentional misconduct
on the part of the employer."' The Cole court distinguished the

holding in Johns-Manville, however, on the basis of intent." 2 In Cole
the plaintiff did not allege that the employer specifically intended to

injure."' Rather, the employer displayed a reckless disregard for the
high probability of causing emotional distress." 4 The Cole court
concluded that an employer who acts with reckless disregard lacks
the higher intent, required under Johns-Manville, to warrant exemption from the exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation." 5
The Cole court stated that even when the employer harbors specific

intent to injure, workers' compensation would be the exclusive remedy if the conduct of the employer is a normal risk of employment." 6
The defendant in Cole argued that the Gates and Ankeny line of
cases were decisive in determining whether workers' compensation
provides the exclusive remedy." 7 Because Cole suffered physical

injuries compensable within the workers' compensation system, the
defendant maintained that a civil action was unnecessary.' Since
the Gates and Ankeny courts were concerned only with determining

whether the employee suffered physical injuries, the Cole court noted
109. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
110. Id. at 469-70, 612 P.2d at 950-51, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
111. Id.
112. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 159, 729 P.2d at 749-50, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. See also Johns-Manville v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 477-78, 612 P.2d 948,
955-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 865-66 (1980) (only specific intent to injure warrants allowing a
civil action for damages thereby upsetting the balance between the employer and employee).
116. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315. The court indicated
that:
[if] characterization of conduct normally occuring in the workplace as unfair or
outrageous were sufficient to avoid the exclusive remedy provision of the Labor
Code, the exception would permit the employee to allege a cause of action in every
case where he suffered mental disability merely by alleging an ulterior purpose of
causing injury. Such an exception would be contrary to the compensation bargain
and unfair to the employer.

Id.
117. Id. at 157, 729 P.2d at 748, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (in Gates and Ankeny the employee
alleged physical injuries accompanying the emotional distress).
118. Id. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the "physical versus nonphysical injury" distinction).
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that alternative grounds for permitting a civil action were not considered."1 9 Thus, the Cole court did not find the Gates and Ankeny
cases persuasive.

120

Although not explicit, language from the Cole opinion suggests
that the normal risk test may be limited to intentional infliction of
emotional distress cases where physical injury is present.' 2' While
Gates, Ankeny, and Renteria are discussed, none of these cases are
expressly rejected or accepted by the Cole majority.'2 The failure of
the court to reject these cases allows the inference that the "physical
verses non-physical injury" approach remains viable and should be
23
applied in conjunction with the normal risk test.
In Cole, the California Supreme Court in Cole shifted the focus
of inquiry from the injury of the employee to the conduct of the
employer in determining when a civil action can be brought for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 24 The conduct of the
employer is analyzed to determine whether the conduct of the employer can be fairly characterized as a normal risk of the employment
relationship. 25 Demotions, promotions, criticism of work practices,
and frictions in negotiations as to grievances are all examples of
conduct falling within the normal risks of employment. 26 The Cole
court distinguished previous cases which had allowed recovery in a
civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the
ground that those cases involved conduct of a "questionable" relationship to employment. 27 Since the conduct of the employer in Cole

119. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 157, 729 P.2d at 748, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 313. Other than the
normal risk test, the court in Cole did not elaborate as to what alternative grounds should
have been considered by the courts in Gates and Ankeny. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 159-60, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315. The court stated: "Nevertheless,

the question remains whether the exclusive remedy provisions exclude liability in a limited class
of cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress causing disability .... ." Id. (emphasis
added).
122. Id. at 156-57, 729 P.2d 746-47, 233 Cal. Rptr at 311-12. According to the court,
Renteria, and the cases following, did not offer support for the plaintiff's position. Id. After
discussion of the Gates and Ankeny cases, the court in Cole stated that, "We proceed to
consider alternative bases for an exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Labor
Code." Id. at 157, 729 P.2d at 747, 233 Cal. Rptr at 312.
123. See 2 B. WITKIN, supra note 37, §§ 52-53, at 608-13 (suggesting that the normal risk
test is applicable only in cases where physical injury is present).
124: Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr at 315.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 161, 729 P.2d at 751, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 316 (citing Johns-Manville Prod. Corp.
v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 477, 612 P.2d 948, 950-51, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 860 (1980)
(employer fraudulently concealed the cause of employee's work-related injury); Magliulo v.
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reflected matters which occur frequently in the workplace, the Cole
court held that a civil action was barred and workers' compensation
28
was deemed the exclusive remedy.

3.

Criticisms of Cole

The majority opinion in Cole can be criticized on several grounds.
First, the additional forms of behavior that will be viewed as conduct

within the normal risks of employment is unclear. The lower courts
must evaluate the conduct of the employer on a case-by-case basis

in order to determine when the conduct is or is not within the normal
risks of employment. The Cole court should have presented a more
concrete analytical framework in order to promote consistency and
prevent needless litigation.
Secondly, the majority in Cole noted that prior California cases
permitting recovery in tort for intentional misconduct are based on
the conduct of an employer having a "questionable" relationship to
employment. 2 9 Even though the majority in Cole did not analogize

to the questionable relationship cases, the deliberate harassment,
humiliation, and psychological assault alleged by the plaintiff appears
questionably related to employment.' 30 Consequently, Cole should

also have been allowed to bring a tort action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
The decision in Cole can also be criticized for the treatment by
the court of extreme and outrageous conduct. 31 Under Cole, if the

conduct of an employer is within the normal risks of employment,
a civil action is barred even if the conduct was extreme and outrageous. However, since the very definition of extreme and outrageous

Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 779, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621, 623 (1975) (employer willfully
physically assaulted employee); Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 630, 498 P.2d 1063,
1066, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 818 (1972) (employer perpetrated fraud on employee); Ramey v.
General Petroleum Corp., 173 Cal. App. 2d 386, 402, 343 P.2d 787, 790-99 (1959) (employer
conspired with a third party tortfeasor to fraudulently conceal the employer's liability for the
employee's injury)).
128. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 161, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
129. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing conduct having a questionable
relationship to employment).
130. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 161, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
131. Id. at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315. According to the court: "[w]hen
the misconduct attributed to the employer is actions which are a normal part of the employment
relationship ... an employee ... may not avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the Labor
Code by characterizing the employer's decisions as manifestly unfair, outrageous, harrassment
or intended to cause emotional disturbance .... " Id.
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conduct is that behavior which civilized society will not tolerate, 3 2
attempting to characterize such conduct as a normal risk of employment is problematic. It seems contradictory to state that conduct not
tolerated in a civilized society can still be considered a normal risk
of employment.
Another ambiguity in the Cole opinion is that the majority indicated, in dicta, that the normal risk test is to be applied regardless
of whether specific intent to injure is alleged. 33 The plaintiff in Cole,
however, alleged only that the defendant acted with reckless disregard
of the high probability that emotional distress would result. 3 4 The
Cole case, therefore, may not stand for the proposition that specific
intent to cause emotional distress is a normal risk of employment.13 5
Another criticism of the Cole opinion concerns the analysis of the
deterrent effect of California Labor Code Section 4553. Section 4553

provides that the amount of compensation otherwise recoverable
under workers' compensation may be increased by one-half when
the employee is injured by the serious and willful misconduct of an
employer. 136 The majority in Cole argued that Labor Code Section
4553 created a "substantial deterrent" to intentional employer mis137
conduct because an employer cannot insure against such liability.
Given the generally low benefits payable under the workers' com-

132. See Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 219, 649 P.2d 894, 901, 185
Cal. Rptr. 252, 259 (1982); Malko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 179 Cal. App. 3d 450, 464, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 817, 831 (1986); Nelson v. GAB Business Serv., 179 Cal. App. 3d 610, 617, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 595, 603 (1986) (intentional infliction of emotional distress is defined as conduct so
outrageous as to exceed all bounds usually tolerated in a civilized community). Abuse of the
employment relationship can also constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. Alcorn v. Anbro
Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
133. See supra text accompanying note 116 (civil action may be barred despite allegations
of specific intent to injure).
134. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 159, 729 P.2d at 749, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
135. Id. (reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional injury should not
warrant exemption from the exclusive remedy provision of the California Labor Code). The
plaintiff urged that the reasoning of Johns-Manville permitted an action at law for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 159, 729 P.2d at 749-50, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15. The
majority in Cole, however, distinguished the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
from the conduct in Johns-Manville, stating that to permit liability where the employer did not
specifically intend to cause emotional distress, but reflected only a reckless disregard of the
probability of causing injury would be contrary to the reasoning in Johns-Manville. Id. The
problem is that the court in Cole ignored the fact that most intentional infliction of emotional
distress cases are based on a specific intent to injure. See W. PROssER & W. KEaTON, supra
note 47, § 12, at 64 (reckless disregard standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress
liability is a minority view).
136. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (workers' compensation benefits may be
increased by one-half if the employer has committed serious and willful misconduct).
137. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 161, 729 P.2d at 751, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
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pensation system, 138 however, an additional payment of one-half of
such an amount is unlikely to suffice to deter employer misconduct.' 39
Additionally, Section 4553 fails to provide additional compensation
for emotional distress in cases where the employee suffers no physical
harm, since only employment disabilities are compensable under the
workers' compensation system. 40 Employers are unlikely to be deterred when a damage award of zero is increased by one-half.
The majority in Cole was also concerned that if intentional infliction of emotional distress claims arising out of employment are
allowed to proceed in a civil action, the tort system will be burdened
with claims already compensable in the workers' compensation system.' 4' The reasoning of the majority is flawed because cases which
result solely in emotional injury are not compensable in workers'
compensation. 42 Furthermore, even if emotional distress cases include
a claim for physical injuries, damages for mental suffering remain
4

unavailable. ' 3
138. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 4453-4458. California is considered one of the lowest paying
states for workers' compensation claims. See S.B. 323, 1987-88, 1st Reg. Sess., sec.1 (Cal.
1987) (introduced Feb. 5, 1987) (pending legislation designed to increase workers' compensation
benefits in California). Currently, California's Workers' Compensation Act authorizes benefits
of up to $224 per week. See SENATE RuLES COMaITTEE, Analysis of S.B. 323, 2 (copy on file
at Pacific Law Journal). The pending legislation would increase the maximum compensation
to $362 per week in 1988 and S435 per week by 1990. Id.
139. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (increasing workers' compensation awards by one-half in the
event of serious and willful misconduct on the part of the employer). The 50-percent increase
in the award authorized by section 4553 is additional compensation and does not represent
exemplary damages. State Dept. of Corrections v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 5 Cal. 3d
885, 891, 489 P.2d 818, 822, 97 Cal. Rptr. 786, 790 (1971); E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 184 Cal. 180, 193, 193 P. 105, 110 (1920). Punitive damages, on the other
hand, are designed to deter extreme and outrageous conduct. CAL. CIw. CODE § 3294 (West
Supp. 1987). Since the primary purpose of punitive damages is to punish and make an example
of the defendant, the wealthier the defendant the larger the punitive assessment must be in
order to achieve deterence. See Merlo v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 3d
5, 130 Cal'Rptr. 416 (1976); Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 18 Cal. App. 3d 266,
95 Cal. Rptr 678 (1971). See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 2 (discussion
of the policies behind punitive damages).
140. See Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447,
455 (1978) ("Where there is no compensable injury, 50 percent of nothing is still nothing, and
Labor Code Section 4553 cannot function as a deterrent").
141. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
142. See Hart v. Nat'l Mortg. & Land Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1431, 235 Cal. Rptr.
68, 75 (1987). See also Renteria, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 455 (1978)
(emotional distress is not compensable in workers' compensation).
143. Mental suffering not constituting an employment disability is not compensable within
workers' compensation. See Fruehauf Corp. v. W.C.A.B., 68 Cal. 2d 569, 574, 440 P.2d 236,
239, 68 Cal. Rptr. 164, 168 (1968) (for an injury to be compensable within the workers'
compensation system the injury must be disabling); Chavez v. W.C.A.B., 31 Cal. App. 3d 5,
8, 106 Cal. Rptr. 853, 856 (1973) ("injury" within the workers' compensation system includes
any event which causes a disability). See generally Note, Azevedo v. Abel: Denial of Employee's
Right to Sue His Employer For An Intentional Tort, 21 HASTINOs L.J. 683, 695-96 (1969).

1988 / Workers' Compensation

REMAINIG QUESTIONS AFTER Cole

Three major questions remain unanswered after Cole v. Fair Oaks
Fire Protection District. The first question is how a court should
determine whether the conduct of the employer constitutes a normal

risk of employment. The second question is whether the 1982 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act allow a civil action for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The final question is
whether the "physical versus non-physical injury" distinction still

applies in cases where the conduct of the employer falls outside of
the normal risks of employment.
A.

What Constitutes a Normal Risk of Employment?
A major question left open by the Cole decision is whether and

under what circumstances tortious employment termination is a normal risk of employment. 144 The California Supreme Court will have

to decide whether wrongful termination cases will be forced into the
workers' compensation system.' 45 Cole could stand for the proposition
144. See Schwartz, Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District: Does the Workers' Compensation Exclusive Remedy Rule Bar Damagesfor Emotional Distressin Wrongful Termination
Cases?, 17 CAL. TRIAL LAw. A.F. 251, 251-53 (1987) (discussion of the application of Cole
to wrongful termination). See also Valenzuela v. California, 194 Cal. App. 3d 916, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 45 (1987) (damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred by the
exclusivity provision in a wrongful termination case because the claim was allegedly based on
conduct normally occurring in the workplace); Green v. City of Oceanside, 194 Cal. App. 3d
212, 239 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1987); Shoemaker v. Myers, 192 Cal. App. 3d 788, 237 Cal. Rptr.
686 (1987), rev. granted -Cal. 3d __, 740 P.2d 404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987) (court held
that terminations were a normal risk of employment).
145. See Shoemaker, 192 Cal. App. 3d 788, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1987). A cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred by the exclusivity provision of
workers' compensation in a wrongful discharge case. Id. at 794-95, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91.
The plaintiff was subjected to direct threats, intimidation and harassment by defendant's for
his investigation of possible illegal practices of certain health care centers receiving state funds.
Id. at 791-92, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 688. The plaintiff was informed by defendants to refrain from
further investigating the centers. Id. The defendant Shuttleworth threatened to fire anyone
responsible for the "leak" of information to the press concerning the funding of the center.
Id. at 792, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 688. On November 4, 1981, Shuttleworth received a complaint
in an unrelated matter to the centers and plaintiff was mistakenly identified as the person
accused. Id. Shuttleworih ordered to have plaintiff interrogated but plaintiff invoked his right
of representation. Id. Plaintiff was fired for insubordination. Id. Compare id. with Cole v.
Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750-51, 233 Cal. Rptr.
308, 315-16 where the court stated:
If characterization of conduct normally occurring in the workplace as unfair or
outrageous were sufficient to avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the Labor
Code, the exception would permit the employee to allege a cause of action in every
case where he suffered mental disability merely by alleging an ulterior purpose of
causing injury. Such an exception would be contrary to the compensation bargain
and unfair to the employer.
Id. (emphasis added).
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that wrongfully terminated employees suffering physical injury may
only seek redress in the workers' compensation system. 46 Although
this proposition would eviscerate the law of wrongful termination,
perhaps Cole will ultimately dictate that all wrongful termination
cases be governed by the exclusivity provision reasoning that termination is a normal risk of employment, regardless of motive or
47
intent. 1
By articulating the normal risk test, the Cole court created the
possibility that termination cases could be forced into workers'
compensation. 48 In determining whether the conduct of the employer
is a normal risk of employment, however, the Cole court should not
have focused on categories of conduct. The focus, instead, should
be upon the motives of the employer. 49 The Cole court held that
the demotion by the employer was a normal risk of employment. 5 0
To believe that the campaign of deliberate harassment, which culminated in the demotion, could ever be considered a normal risk of
employment under any standard is difficult. The problem therefore,
is determining whether the demotion was done with specific intent
to injure. If a demotion or termination is made with proper motives
then it should be considered a normal risk of employment.' To
avoid this problem, the courts should scrutinize the facts closely to
determine whether or not the actions taken by the employer were
prompted by malicious intent. Otherwise, the courts could simply
characterize the conduct as falling within the categories announced
in Cole, and the intentional misconduct by the employer would be
2
deemed a normal risk of employment.1
B. Effect of 1982 Amendments to the California Workers'
Compensation Act on Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The question remains whether the Legislature intended to abrogate
the Renteria exception allowing a civil action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress by failing to codify the exception in the 1982

146. See Schwartz, supra note 144 at 251 (discussing potential application of the normal
risk test to all emotional distress damages).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See infra notes 210-212 and accompanying text (discussing the inapplicability of the
workers' compensation system to intentionally tortious conduct).
150. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 164, 729 P.2d at 755, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 320 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).

1988 / Workers' Compensation
amendments. 153 If so, then Renteria is no longer an exception to the

exclusivity provision of workers' compensation. If the legislature did
not intend, then the Renteria exception is still viable notwithstanding
the 1982 amendments and the decision in Cole.
Prior to the 1982 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act,
California Labor Code Section 3600 provided that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries.1 54 The 1982
amendments changed the language in section 3600 to read as follows:
"liability for the compensation provided by this division, . . except
as otherwise specifically provided in sections 3602, 3706, and 4558
. . ,,5 The insertion of the "otherwise specifically" language can
be interpreted as requiring all exceptions to the exclusivity provision
to be expressly provided for by statute. Logically, if certain judiciallycreated exceptions which existed prior to the 1982 amendments were
not included in the statutory exceptions, the legislature intended to
nullify them. If this reasoning is accepted, then the only exceptions
to the exclusivity provision are those which are codified and the
courts cannot create implied exceptions. Accordingly, since intentional infliction of emotional distress was not codified as an excep56
tion, workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy.
In contrast, intentional infliction of emotional distress may still be
a viable exception to the exclusivity provision. A cursory reading of
the 1982 amendments suggests that those civil actions not codified
as exceptions to Labor Code Section 3600 should be governed by the
exclusivity provision. Subsequent to the 1982 amendments, however,
the court in Howland v. Balma 57 held that an employee could bring

153. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (Vest Supp. 1987). This section states in pertinent part that
workers' compenstion provides the exclusive remedy except where the employee's injury is
caused by a willful physical assault by an employer, where the employee's injury is aggravated
by the employer's fraudulent concealment of the existence of the injury and where the
employee's injury is caused by a defective product manufactured by the employer and that
product is provided for the employee's use by a third person. Id.
154. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971).
155. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (vest Supp. 1987).
156. The basis for this viewpoint has been rejected in two recent California cases. See
Hart v. Nat'l Mortgage & Land Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1424, 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 75
(1987) (allowing a civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress despite the 1982
amendments); Howland v. Balma, 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 904-05, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286, 290
(1983) (allowing a civil action for defamation despite the 1982 amendments).
157. 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1983). The Howland court pointed out

that the Workers' Compensation Act relates to medical and/or occupational injuries, i.e.,
those risks to which the fact of employment in the industry exposes' the employee. Id. at 904,
192 Cal. Rptr. at 289. The gist of an action for slander, on the other hand, is damage to
reputation. Id. An injury to reputation affects a proprietary interest and is not a personal
injury. Id. Moreover, defamation and slander were exceptions to the exclusivity provision prior
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a civil action against an employer for slander despite the exclusivity
provision.- 8 The court found that slander was simply not considered
by the legislature when amending the Labor Code.'5 9 Therefore, the
plaintiff was allowed to recover for the non-physical damages available in a slander action.1 60 Intentional infliction of emotional distress,
like slander, was arguably not considered when the legislature amended
the Labor Code in 1982, and therefore, a civil action should be
allowed.'16
Similarly, in Hodges v. Sweetwater Union High School District,'62
the court specifically considered whether the 1982 amendments af-

fected the judicially-created exception for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 163 Upon close examination of the 1982 amendments, the Hodges court found that the statutory language referred
only to actions involving injuries of a physical nature.' 64 According
to the Hodges court, since the Labor Code defines injury in terms
of a physical disability, a non-physical injury, such as emotional
distress, is not included within the statutory framework. 165 The court
indicated that if workers' compensation was the sole remedy, an
employer could inflict outrageous behavior upon an employee while
remaining shielded from liability by the statutes. 66 Accordingly, the
Hodges court stated that the legislature did not intend an employee's
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress to be
viewed as an injury for purposes of workers' compensation. 67 The
to the 1982 amendments. See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 151,
729 P.2d 743, 744, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 309 (1987) (California Supreme Court did not overrule
the California Court of Appeal for the Third District's holding that the causes of action
for defamation and privacy are not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the California
Labor Code). Cole was not decided under the 1982 amendments as the cause of action occurred
prior to the effective date of the amendments, and there is no retroactive application. Id. at
153, 729 P.2d at 745, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
158. Howland, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (1983).
159. Id. at 905, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
160. Id.
161. Id. See generally Review of Selected 1982 California Legislation, 14 PAC. L.J. 357,
763-68 (1983) (discussion of the 1982 amendments). It is clear that at the time the workers'
compensation laws were enacted, the common law did not recognize an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and therefore such an action was not within the contemplation
of the legislature. Id.
162. 228 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1986) (discussion of this case is for purposes of illustration only).
Pursuant to California Rules of Court sections 976(b) and 976.1, the California Supreme
Court has ordered the Hodges opinion depublished. CAL. R. CT. 976(b), 976.1 (West Supp.
1987). As a result, the case cannot be cited as authority in the California courts. Id.
163. 228 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
164. Id. at 468.
165. Id. at 467-68.
166. Id. at 469-70.
167. Id. at 470.
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court held that an employee could bring a civil action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress regardless of the new exclusivity
6s
provision.'
Hart v. NationalMortgage and Land Co. 169 also considered whether
the 1982 amendments affected the exception for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.170 The court stated that intentional infliction
of emotional distress is one wrong for which the workers' compensation system provides no remedy.'71 The court concluded that the
exception must be viable if employees are to have redress for wrongful
acts committed by their employers, and therefore, the exception did
172
not die with the 1982 amendments.
In summary, for several reasons the 1982 amendments to the
California Workers' Compensation Act should be construed to permit
an implied exception for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
First, since emotional harm is non-compensable within workers'
compensation, an employee will be left without a remedy. 73 The
workers' compensation system is designed to compensate workers for
injuries suffered as a result of employment, irrespective of fault, but
not intentionally tortious conduct. 74 Therefore, intentionally tortious
conduct should be exempted from the workers' compensation system,
either explictly through the statutes or implicity through judicial
decisions.
C. Is The "Physical Versus Non-Physical Injury" Distinction Still
Viable After Cole?
The Cole court held only that workers' compensation provides the
exclusive remedy when the conduct of the employer is within the
normal risks of employment. 75 In Hart v. National Mortgage and
Land Co., 76 the court held that a civil action should be allowed
when the conduct of the employer does not constitute a normal risk

168. Id.
169. 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 235 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1987).
170. Id. at 1425, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (emotional distress is a non-compensable
injury in the workers' compensation system).
174. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (workers' compensation was not
designed to deter or encourage intentionally tortious conduct). See also supratext accompanying
notes 1-4, 35-40 (purposes of workers' compensation).
175. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987).
176. 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1430, 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 74 (1987).
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of employment. 7 In examining the Hart opinion, the "physical
versus non-physical injury" distinction is still viable when the
conduct of the employer is outside the normal risks of employment.
Hart v. National Mortgage and Land Co.
A.

The Facts
The plaintiff, Hart, along with Campbell and Adams were all
supervisors in the defendant's company.17 During the time Hart and
Campbell worked together, Campbell allegedly made unwelcomed
sexual advances and crude remarks towards Hart. 79 Hart complained
to his superiors about Campbell's behavior, but no action was taken
to alleviate the problem. 18 0 After approximatly eighteen months, Hart
resigned because of a nervous condition allegedly caused by Camp8
bell's behavior.' '
B.

The Opinion
The Hart court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to bring
a civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 2 In
reaching this decision, the court first applied the normal risk test
enunciated in Cole.'83 Noting that Hart's employer was not engaged
in conduct consisting of promotions, demotions, criticism of job
performance or friction in negotiations, the Hart court concluded
that the conduct was not within the normal risks of employment.8 4
Moreover, the Hart court drew an analogy between the conduct of
the defendant and those cases in which the conduct of the employer
bore a questionable relationship to employment.' 85 According to the

177.
178.
179.

Id. at 1430, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
Id. at 1424, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
Id. (on several occasions Campbell would, "grab Hart's genitals, grab Hart around

the waist and try to mount him and make sexually suggestive gestures, accompanied by crude
remarks.").
180.

Id.

181.

Id. Hart told one of his supervisors, "'[Campbell] has really done it to me ...with

his ... horsing around .... ' Id.
182. Id. at 1429-30, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
183. Id. In Cole, the court held that when the conduct of the employer is within the

normal risks of employment, workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy. Cole v.
Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308,
315 (1987).
184.
185.

Hart, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1429-30, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
Id. See also supra note 127 and accompanying text (description of conduct found to

have a questionable relationship to employment).
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court in Hart, there was little doubt that Campbell's conduct bore a
86
questionable relationship to employment.'
Since the plaintiff had alleged substantial physical injuries, the

Hart court was confronted with the "physical versus non-physical
injury" distinction. Application of the Gates and Ankeny approach
would have forced the plaintiff into the workers' compensation
' However, the court chose to abandon the "physical versus
system. 87
non-physical injury" distinction, thus abrogating later interpretations
of Renteria and allowing the plaintiff to bring a civil action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 88 The Hart court concluded that whenever the conduct of the employer is outside the
normal risks of employement, it is irrelevant whether the plaintiff
suffers physical injuries.18 9 The court reasoned that conduct constituting intentional infliction of emotional distress leading to both
physical and emotional injury is often more reprehensible than conduct leading only to mental suffering.190 According to the Hart court,
an anamoly would arise if a plaintiff with no physical injuries is
allowed to bring a civil action, while the victim of possibly more
egregious conduct resulting in physical injuries is limited to a workers'
compensation claim.' 9'
C. Analysis of Hart v. National Mortgage and Land Co.
By eliminating the "physical versus non-physical injury" distinc-

tion, Hart may conflict with other appellate courts. 92 An unanswered
question is whether the Cole court impliedly holds that a civil action

is allowed whenever the conduct of the employer is deemed outside

the normal risks of employment, whether or not physical injuries are

186. Id.
187. See Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979);
Ankeny v. Lockheed Missles & Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979)
(cases barring an action at law for intentional infliction of emotional distress when physical
injuries are alleged, reasoning that an action at law is unnecessary when the injury is
compensable within workers' compensation). But c.f. Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal.
App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978) (action at law allowed for intentional infliction of
emotional distress when only emotional harm is alleged, reasoning that emotional harm is
noncompensble within workers' compensation).
188. Hart, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1430, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
189. Id. at 1429, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74.
190. Id.
191. Id. The Hart court also cited Cole for this proposition. Id.
192. Id. at 1428-29, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74 (refusing to follow Gates and Ankeny).
Compare id. with Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 204-05, 155 Cal. Rptr.
486, 491-92 (1979); Ankeny v. Lockheed Missles & Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 533, 533, 151
Cal. Rptr. 828, 829 (1979) ("physical injury versus non-physical injury" distinction).
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alleged. Since the Cole court merely applied the exclusivity provision
when an employer's conduct is a normal risk, the courts can determine whether or not to bar civil actions when the conduct of the
employer is not a normal risk.
If a civil action is allowed whenever the conduct of the employer
is not a normal risk, and irrespective of whether physical injuries
are alleged, then the courts would be adopting the approach set forth
in Hart. 93 If, on the other hand, the courts apply the "physical
versus non-physical injury" distinction, a civil action would be allowed if only emotional harm is alleged, even if the conduct of the
employer is outside the normal risks of employment. 94 When physical
injuries are alleged, workers' compensation remains the exclusive
remedy for intentional infliction of emotional distress cases arising
out of the employment relationship.' 95
POSSIBLE APPROACHES To VARIOUS FACTUAL SITUATIONS AFTER
Cole and Hart
there are three variables to consider when analyzing the potential
factual situations that may confront the courts. The first variable is
whether the employee has suffered any physical injury. The second
is whether the conduct of the employer is within the normal risks of
employment. The third is whether the employee can establish the
elements necessary to sustain a tort action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
A.

If Physical and Emotional Injuries Are Alleged

The normal risk test of Cole is clearly applicable to cases where
physical injuries, causing disability, are alleged.',96 If an employee sues
for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging both physical
and emotional injuries, and the conduct of the employer is within
the normal risks of employment, workers' compensation is the ex-

193. Hart, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1430, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (holding that when the conduct
of the employer is not a normal risk of employment an action at law for intentional infliction
of emotional distress may be maintained).
194. See Gates, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 206, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 492 (citing Ankeny, 88 Cal.
App. 3d at 533, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 829) (action at law unnecessary because physical injuries
are compensable in workers' compensation).
195. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (action at law unnecessary because physical
injuries are compensable in workers' compensation).
196. See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 155-57, 729 P.2d 743,
747-49, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312-13 (1987) (discussing but not overruling Renteria).
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clusive remedy. 197 The employee's recovery, however, will be limited

to damages for physical injury since emotional distress is noncompensable in the workers' compensation system. 19 If, on the other
hand, the employee sues for intentional infliction of emotional dis-

tress alleging both physical and emotional injury, and the conduct
of the employer is outside the normal risks of employment, then the

Hart approach permits a civil action. 199 Some courts, however, may
choose to apply the "physical versus non-physical injury" distinction

and force the case into the workers' compensation system. 200 Courts
choosing to follow the Gates and Ankeny "physical versus nonphysical injury" distinction would reason that since the employee has

suffered a work-related physical injury compensable under workers'
compensation, a civil action is unnecessary regardless of whether the
conduct of the employer is outside the normal risks of employment. 20 1
B. If Only Emotional Injury Is Alleged
Cole may stand for the proposition that the normal risk test should
not be applied to cases where an employee has not suffered physical

injury.202 The Renteria approach, allowing a civil action when only
emotional injuries are present, may therefore, still be viable. 20 3 If so,

the courts would not be required to analyze whether the conduct of
the employer is within the normal risks of employment.
In contrast, the normal risk test may be applied to all intentional

infliction of emotional distress cases arising out of employment.2 04 If
the courts adopt this approach, an employee who does not allege

physical injuries may have a civil action depending on whether the
conduct of the employer is or is not within the normal risks of
employment. If the conduct of the employer is within the normal

197. Id. at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
198. See Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
199. See Hart v. Nat'l Mort. & Land Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1430, 235 Cal. Rptr.
68, 74 (1987) (action at law for intentional infliction of emotional distress available when
employer's conduct is outside the normal risks of employment).
200. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussion of the Renteria, Gates, and
Ankeny approaches).
201. Id.
202. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (suggesting that the normal risk test is
applicable only in cases where physical injury is present).
203. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Renteria exception
may still be viable).
204. See A. Schwartz, supra note 144, at 251 (defense counsel are currently arguing that
the normal risk test is applicable to "all emotional distress damages with and without physical
manifestations").
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risks of employment, the employee may, in theory, have only a

workers' compensation remedy. 2° Because emotional distress not
causing disability is not compensable within the workers' compen20 6
sation system, however, the employee will be without a remedy.

If, instead, the conduct of the employer is outside the normal risks
20 7
of employment, the employee will be entitled to bring a civil action.
C. If the Elements of the Tort Cannot Be Established
If the employee is unable to establish the elements of intentional

infliction of emotional distress, the only possible remedy is workers'
compensation. 208 The problem, therefore, is whether a workers' compensation claim is still possible when the conduct of the employer is

outside the normal risks of employment. If the conduct of the
employer is outside the normal risks of employment, some courts

may apply the Gates and Ankeny distinction, if physical injury is
present, allowing a workers' compensation claim reasoning that a
compensable injury exists.209 Other courts, however, may apply the

Hart interpretation of Cole and reason that since the conduct of the

205. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987).
206. See supra notes 142, 173 and accompanying text (emotional distress non-compensable
in workers' compensation).
207. See Hart v. Nat'l Mort. & Land Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1430, 235 Cal. Rptr.
68, 74 (1987) (civil action for intentional infliction of emotional distress available when the
conduct of the employer is outside the normal risks of employment).
208. See Gates v. Trans Video Corp. 93 Cal. App. 3d 96, 206, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486, 492
(1979) and Ankeny v. Lockheed Missles & Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 533, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 828, 829 (1979) (regardless of the culpability of the employer, workers' compensation is
available when physical injuries arising out of employment occur). For example, assume the
following facts. Abel and Baker are employed by Ernie. Both Abel and Baker have an irrational
fear of snakes. One day Ernie, knowing of Abel's susceptibility to snakes, but not of Baker's,
decides to scare Abel by exhibiting a snake. Ernie approaches Abel and Baker, exhibits the
snake and both suffer a heart attack. Abel could establish the elements of intentional infliction
of emotional distress since Ernie knowingly preyed upon a known special susceptibility of
Abel. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498, 468 P.2d 216, 218-19, 86 Cal. Rptr.
88, 90-91 (1970). Abel would also be able to avoid application of the exclusivity rule, assuming

that Ernie's behavior is outside the normal risks of behavior. Hart, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420,
1424, 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 75. Baker, on the other hand, would be unable to establish intentional
infliction of emotional distress, even though Ernie's conduct was beyond the normal risks of
employment, since Ernie was unaware of Baker's unreasonable susceptibility to snakes. Scott
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 Cal. App. 3d 277, 291, 112 Cal. Rptr. 609, 619 (1974). In
such a case, workers' compenstion is the only possible remedy. The courts may allow recovery
under workers' compensation on the theory that the injury arose out of and in the course of
employment, even though the conduct causing injury was not a normal risk of employment.
209. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1987) (work-related physical injury compensable regardless of fault). See also Gates, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 204-05, 155 Cal. Rptr. at
491-92 (work-related physical injury compensable regardless of fault); Ankeny, 88 Cal. App.
3d at 533, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 829 (same).
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employer is not a normal risk of employment, the employee is barred
from the Workers' Compensation system. 210 This approach is predicated on a reading of Hart which mandates legal remedies to the

exclusion of workers' compensation when the conduct of the employer is outside the normal risks. It seems more likely, however,
that Hart simply permits a legal remedy under certain circumstances,
while allowing a workers' compensation remedy in all other work211
related situations.
PROPOSAL
The courts should limit the effect of the normal risk test set forth
in Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District. Outrageous conduct

should never be considered a normal risk of employment.2 12 Furthermore, the courts should adopt the approach in Hart and permit a

civil action whenever the conduct of the employer is not a normal
risk of employment.2 1 3 The effect of this will be to allow an employee

to bring a civil action anytime a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is properly alleged. However, if the
courts are unwilling to limit Cole, then the legislature should amend

the Workers' Compensation Act to include intentional infliction of
emotional distress as an exception to the exclusivity provision.

210. See Hart v. Nat'l Mortgage & Land Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1430, 235 Cal.
Rptr. 68, 74 (1987) (action at law available for intentional infliction of emotional distress
when the conduct of the employer is outside the normal risks of employment).
211. Id.
212. The Cole case should be limited because it unfairly forces severely injured people into
the workers' compensation system. The Cole majority implicitly recognizes the unfairness of
forcing severly distressed plaintiffs into the workers' compensation system. See Cole, 43 Cal.
3d at 156, 729 P.2d at 753, 233 Cal Rptr. at 313. It is universally recognized that the workers'
compensation system yields significantly smaller recoveries than the civil system. Id. When
discussing the "physical versus non-physical injury" distinction, the court noted:
We recognize that the distinction drawn by the [physical versus non-physical
injury] cases presents an anomaly. Intentional infliction of emotional distress which
results in physical injury and disability is ordinarily more reprehensible than intentional infliction of emotional distress which does not result in disability, but civil
action is allowed only in the latter situation.
Id. The anomaly referred to by the court is that extreme and outrageous conduct, leading to
dire physical injury, is not deterred by the prospect of a low workers' compensation assessment
while less egregious conduct may lead to a massive award in the civil system. Id. The Cole
court solved this problem, not by allowing the tort system to serve its deterrent function, but
by continuing to shield employers from the deterrent effect of tort judgments. See supra note
121 and accompanying text (the normal risk test may apply only to cases of physical injury,
thereby allowing a civil action when only emotional injury is alleged and deterring conduct
that is less egregious than that which leads to physical injury).
213. 189 Cal. App. 3d 1429, 1430, 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 74 (1987).
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The decision by the Cole court to include intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims within the workers' compensation system is
arguably inconsistent with the policies underlying both workers'
compensation and tort systems. 214 Although workers' compenstion is
a bargain and exchange system, the bargain seems fair only when
the conduct of the employer is not morally culpable. 215 When workers'
compensation was originally enacted, as a no-fault liability system,
the legislature meant conduct not intending to cause injury.21 6 Since

the workers' compensation system only compensates for eniployment
disabilities and not for emotional distress as such, workers' compensation may not deter intentionally tortious conduct.2 1 7 If a civil action
is not allowed when the employer specifically intends to inflict
emotional distress, the employee may be uncompensated and the
employer may not be deterred from certain egregious conduct. The

deterrent effect of tort law, through large damage awards, is therefore

not realized.21 8 Because conduct intended to cause injury is blame-

worthy and should be deterred, the exclusivity provision should not
be invoked in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases.
In addition, several factors indicate that conduct specifically de-

signed to injure employees is not subject to workers' compensation.
For example, the California legislature has amended the exclusive

remedy provision to allow a civil action for certain intentional
employer misconduct.2 19 California Labor Code Section 3602 allows
an action at law where an employer willfully physically assaults an

214. See supra notes 1-4, 26, 36-41 and accompanying text. The workers' compensation
system was designed to compensate employees for industrial accidents who were left remediless
because of the three common law defenses of assumption of the risk, contributory negligence,
and the fellow servant doctrine. See supra note 26. See also, W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 47, § 2 (the purpose of the law of torts is to deter egregious conduct and to compensate
for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another).
215. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 167, 729 P.2d 743, 757, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308, 320 (1987) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
216. See id. The court stated that the "[workers' compensation] bargain appears fair where
the employer's conduct is negligent or even reckless, [but] it is difficult to justify shielding the
employer from "the full brunt of liability where, as here, the employer has acted intentionally
and with the purpose of injuring the employee" (citing Comment, Johns-Manville Product
Corp. v. Superior Court: The Not-So Exclusive Remedy Rule, 33 HAsTINCs L.J. 263, 270
(1981); Tomita, The Exclusive Remedy of Workers' Compensation for Intentional Torts of
the Employer: Johns-Manville Products v. Superior Court, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 27, 45 (1982)).

Id.
217. See Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447,
454 (1978) (intentional wrongdoing by the employer in the employment setting has presented
many troubling issues).
218. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 2.
219. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West Supp. 1987).
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employee2 0 or where an employer fraudulently conceals the existence
of an injury in connection with the employment.2 l Furthermore,
workers' compensation has been held not to be the exclusive remedy

for other intentional torts such as defamation 2 z and invasion of
privacy.22 3 Therefore, since intentional infliction of emotional distress

is analogous to willful physical assaults and defamations, the legislature should amend California Labor Code Section 3602 to codify
24
an exception for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

CONCLUSION

The state of the law with regard to intentional infliction of emotional distress and workers' compensation is characterized by confusion. Although Cole formulated a new approach to determine those
circumstances under which an employee may bring a civil action,
this method is problematic. The approach precludes a civil action
when the conduct of an employer is within the normal risks of the
employment relationship.225 No explicit test, however, was set forth
to determine when the conduct of an employer is within the normal
risks. Furthermore, the Cole court failed to enunciate the available
remedies when the conduct of an employer is construed as being
outside the normal risks of employment. 226
This comment proposes that Cole v. Fair Oaks Protection District
should be limited so that outrageous conduct should never be considered a normal risk of employment. The reasoning in Hart v.
National Mortgage and Land Co. should be adopted to allow a civil
action whenever the conduct of an employer is outside the normal

220. Id. at § 3602(b)(1) (codifying Magliulo v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 160, 121
Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975)).

221. Id. at

§ 3602(a)(2) (codifying Johns-Manville v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612

P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980)).
222. Howland v. Balma, 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1983). See also 2 B.
WrrKiN, supra note 37, § 51, at 608 (defamation is an exception to the exclusive remedy
provision).
223. See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 151, 729 P.2d 743, 745,
233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 310 (1987) (upholding right of plaintiff to proceed in a civil action for
invasion of privacy and defamation).
224. In Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 812 (1975), the court held that a failure of workers' compensation law to include some
element of damage recoverable at common law is a legislative, and not a judicial problem.
Id. at 120, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
225. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987).
226. Id.
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risks of employment. In the absence of either of the foregoing, this
comment recommends that the legislature should amend the Workers'
Compensation Act to include intentional infliction of emotional

distress as an exception to the exclusivity provision. A response by
the courts and legislature is required to effectuate the respective
policies of the tort and workers' compensation systems.
Kelly D. Feese

